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I.

Two PROVERBS AND INTRODUCTION

The thesis of this article is that the commonality of challenges
facing both inter-governmental negotiators and international business
negotiators is more predominant than the differences in these two
situations. The importance of recognition of this commonality is due to the
prevalent interchangeability between diplomats and actors in the business
world, the closer identification between international politics and
international economics, and the need for formulating courses in
negotiation from which both the diplomat and the business person would
draw nearly equal benefits.
In the course of the research, two proverbs were discovered which
are used here as a prologue to the body of this article. The wisdom
conveyed by these proverbs, which underlie the entire purpose of
negotiation, is of equal benefit to both the governmental negotiator and the
private intercontinental transactional negotiator. The first of the two
proverbs is a Kikuyu (African) adage which states: "To be hard does not
mean to be hard as a stone, and to be soft does not mean to be soft as
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water."'
The other is a common Chinese proverb which is highly
applicable to the two different contexts of negotiation, however, it is nonattributable. This proverb states: From listening comes wisdom, and from
speaking, repentance.
Before proceeding to the presentation and analysis of the shared
concerns of both the inter-goyernmental negotiator and the transnational
business negotiator, reference should be made to the main differences
between the contexts within which these two actors operate. For case of
reference, this article uses the shorthand of diplomat (D) and business
person (B) within the arena of international negotiations. One of the
essential differences between D and B is that the former, as a
representative of sovereignty, has a pressure tool which is unavailable to B
as a negotiator. 2 That tool is the "mobilization of domestic political
support." 3 However, B is endowed with an advantage that D does not
have in most negotiating situations, B can proceed with negotiations
without having to let the public in on it. B's secrecy cannot, under most
circumstances, be called into question, while D, especially in democratic
societies, "cannot develop a negotiating position on a major issue without
letting the public in on some of the internal controversies. "4
Nonetheless, an advantage accrues to D, which generally is either
irrelevant or unavailable to B, the availability of international force and
institutions for settling of controversies. The United States, for example,
can resort to the United Nations Security Council as a means of putting
pressure on the Haitian military government; but a United States business
person cannot use this instrumentality in negotiations with a Haitian
counterpart.
The pendulum of advantages swings again in the direction of B
over D in a very important respect in the analysis of differences between
these two international actors. When B enters in negotiation with his/her
counterpart, the intent is certainly to reach a mutually-agreed settlement if
at all possible. This certainty of intent, however, is at times lacking in the
case of D. Sometimes a government "enters negotiations simply to deflect
domestic opposition to its militant policy or to forestall domestic pressures
to make a unilateral conciliatory move." President Nixon's first trip to
1.
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China falls within this category. In addition, D is sometimes faced with
inherently unsolvable disputes, such as those "involving ethnic issues,
minorities, [and] ideology ...
"6
In spite of these differences, the
challenges which are common to D and B as negotiators predominate.
II.

NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND NEGOTIATION STYLES
The above two elements are intertwined and represent the core of
the commonality of challenges facing both D and B within the international
negotiators context. Both D and B, in negotiating with their American or
Soviet counterparts, have to be aware of a major difference in negotiating
styles which is attributable to the difference in national characteristics.
Whereas the American negotiator looks upon negotiation as a hurdle to be
overcome, the Soviet negotiator looks upon it as a power play. President
Carter expressed this crucial difference aptly when he said:
[t]o Americans, a negotiation is most often looked upon as
an obstacle to be overcome in order to reach a desired
goal. For the Soviets ... the same negotiation was almost
an end in itself X a ritual that demonstrated to the world
that they were equal in status to the United States.,
The Soviet's perception of negotiation as primarily a power tool,
not a means to conflict resolution on the basis of shared interests, is
articulated as "preoccupation with authority, avoidance of risk, [and an]
imperative need to assert control.-"
Thus it is of primary importance for both D and B to bear the
symbiosis between national characteristics and negotiation styles in mind.
In fact, when we look further into the scope of this common challenge
facing both D and B equally, we discern an interesting variance. National
negotiating styles vary for the same national group depending on whom is
facing that national group in negotiations. Taking Egypt as an example,
former United States Ambassador to Israel, Samuel Lewis observed the
following: "Egyptian negotiation behavior varies from region to region.
"9

The same relationship between nationality and negotiation style
confronts B in a more direct way than in the case of D. While treaties and
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other international inter-state instruments vary between general and
detailed, depending on the issues and circumstances, business agreements
drafted by Americans give the impression of being over-negotiated. In
drafting contracts, which an American B is likely to propose to a foreign
B, the drafter "often attempt[s] to deal with every possible contingency.' 0
This is in contrast to the practice of most foreign Bs who "generally tend
to prefer more broadly framed agreements and to deal with the details of
implementation as they arise.""
Returning to the broad characteristic of nationality as an indicator
of negotiation style, irrespective of whether the negotiators are Ds or Bs,
we find that the French tend to be "prone to elaborate historicalphilosophical themes," while the Germans, like the Americans, place

"greater emphasis on legal aspects. "12

The relationship between nationality and style is quite
understandable in terms of the impact of culture on negotiation as a means
of conflict resolution. Culture and national background influences differing
negotiating styles' 3 and should therefore rank high among the common
challenges facing both D and B as they consider their best alternative to
negotiated agreements and how to prepare their pre-negotiation steps.
III. THE PRE-NEGOTIATION STAGE
Another important challenge which is common to both D and B as
The
negotiators is the preparation for the pre-negotiation stage.
4
phase"
diagnostic
"the
as
sometimes
described
stage,
this
importance of
stems from the fact that it is largely subjective. Here the parties, each for
themselves, determine whether the issue is negotiable. Therefore, "if the
opponent refuses even to consider that a mutually agreeable solution may
be possible, of course it is not possible."'" The Asian-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum held in Seattle, Washington, in late November
1993 offers an example. At that summit, it was clear to President Clinton,
before he held his meeting with the Chinese Prime Minister, that the issue
of China's respect for human rights within its borders was non-
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negotiable.16 This was a pre-negotiation determination. Though it is
presumed that the President raised it, the Prime Minister skirted the issue
by talking about the virtues of "non-interference in the internal affairs of
other [states]."
Thus it could be seen from the APEC example that among the
benefits of the pre-negotiation stage to both D and B are: a) to hear "the
other party's point of view[,J"s and b) to signal a change in the
relationship between the two parties which may bring about "a
reassessment of alternatives and add negotiation to the strategies of conflict
management that are seriously considered." 9 However, there is an
additional advantage to the pre-negotiation stage for both D and B,
namely, crisis avoidance. In this regard, the pre-negotiation stage has a
tendency to take the opposing parties to the edge of the precipice which
generally triggers an inclination in favor of conflict resolution. The phase
of Egyptian-Israeli relationship which preceded Camp David negotiations
in 1978 is instructive. The United States felt that "the status quo was
inherently dangerous; the Egyptian authorities perceived the gathering of a
storm if progress was not made before the expiration of the second
disengagement agreement;" and the leaders of Israel "faced an intensifying
domestic crisis. "2 The perception on the part of D or B of what Professor
Zartman describes as "the conjunction of threat and opportunity " 2' not only
enhances the attractiveness of the negotiation option, it also helps the
parties in the collection of relevant information about their adversary's
position, enables leaders to prepare for what Harold Saunders calls
"arranging the negotiation,"" and sets or delimits "the agenda for

negotiation. "23
In combining these benefits of the pre-negotiation phase, benefits
which are common to D and B as international negotiators, (especially the
benefit of early information gathering), another advantage emerges in
lowering what Professor Scardilli aptly describes as a "premium on

16. R. W. Apple, Jr., The Pacific Summit: 'Dialogue Is Begun As Clinton Meets With
China's Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1993, §1, at 1.
17. Id.
18.

ZARTMAN & BERMAN, supra note 13, at 85.

19.

JANICE GROSS STEIN, GETTING TO THE TABLE: THE PROCESSES OF INTERNATIONAL

PRE-NEGOTIATION 239 (1989).
20. Id. at 243.
21.

Id. at 245.

22. Id. at 248.
23.

Id. at 254.
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competition. "I
In this connection, the pre-negotiation phase which
constitutes a common challenge to both D and B, contributes to the
betterment of fact-finding and lowers the cost of "our confrontational
adversary system of trials. "25 Once negotiations are entered into, other
challenges emerge of a practical nature which confront either the intergovernmental diplomatic negotiator (D) or the international business
negotiator (B) and are presented in the balance of this article.
IV. THE CULTURAL GAP AND ITS IMPACT
By their adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in November 1993, the United States House of Representatives,
and later the Senate, seems to have given a green light to the Executive
Branch to globally pursue the liberalization of trade through the lowering
of tariff barriers. Hence it was not surprising that the momentum seemed
to propel United States negotiators, including President Clinton, at the
APEC forum (discussed in Section III above) as well as at the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) negotiations.
The global
character of these negotiations brings forth the challenge of the cultural
gap which confronts both D and B negotiators. This cultural gap, although
an aspect of national characteristics discussed in Section II above, is
distinct from those characteristics as it has to do with the creation of a
chasm between two multinational sets of negotiators.
In taking five nationalities as examples of producing cultural gaps
in international business negotiations X equally applicable to diplomatic
negotiators X the case of the commonality of the challenge of the cultural
gap between negotiators is made. Examples of these are the Chinese, the
Soviets, the Japanese, the French, and the Egyptians. In this sense,
culture has to be understood in its larger framework which includes:
civilization, history, values, political systems, and the national perception
of the nation's place in the world. Keeping this in mind, the Chinese, as
negotiators "tend to stress at the outset their commitments to abstract
principles and will make concessions at the eleventh hour after they have
fully assessed the limits of their interlocutor's flexibility." 26 Unlike the
Chinese, the Soviet negotiator makes concessions slice by slice much like
salami-slicing tactics. A quid pro quo is expected for each concession."

24. Frank J. Scardilli, Law, Lawyers and the Tyranny of Illusion, HUMANIST, Sept./Oct.
1981, at 24.
25. Id.
26.
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The Japanese look upon negotiations as "a form of social conflict" where
the personal relationship with the opposite negotiator is emphasized.
These relationships are "of value to the Japanese negotiator for informal,
frank discussions where social conflict is minimal and progress can be

made on a pragmatic basis. "2
In contrast to the Chinese, Soviet, and Japanese negotiators, the
French and the Egyptians are described as suspicious of international
negotiations, but for different reasons. This is, in part, reflected in French
negotiators reliance on "highly rational abstract logic and general
principles,"' 9 and Egyptian negotiators historic fear of "collusion and
intervention of external powers" through the process of negotiation °
Exemplifying the role of the cultural gap in international
negotiations is the attitude adopted by a Japanese firm in negotiating a joint
venture with a United States firm?' Progress was being made until the
arbitration clause was reached and resulted in an impasse.2 The Japanese,
for reasons of national pride and convenience, wanted the arbitration to
take place in Japan; the United States firm wanted it to be located outside
Japan.3 The stalemate persisted until the Japanese asked their American
counterparts whether they had ever participated in arbitration.4 Upon
receiving the American response in the negative, the Japanese sensed that
neither side would ever resort to it, and quickly proposed that arbitration
would take place in Hawaii."
Now with NAFTA promising to bring American and Mexican
business negotiators together more frequently in the future, it is worth
examining the cultural gap in such business situations which are akin to
those faced by diplomats.
In their seminal article on inter-cultural
communication, Hall and Whyte 6 outline a number of cultural variables,
among which the following may be noted as important in international
negotiations:
a) punctuality is interpreted differently;

28. Id. at vi-viii.
29. Id. at vii-viii.
30.

Id.

31.

GRIFFIN & DAGGATT, supra note 1,at 18.

32, Id.
33, Id.
34.

Id.

35, Id.at19.
36. Hall & Whyte, Intercultural Communication: A Guide to Men of Action, 19 HUM.
ORG. 320 (1960).
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b) Latin Americans "don't usually schedule appointments
3
to the exclusion of other appointments;" 7
c) whereas in the United States, discussion "is a means to
an end," 38 in Latin America, "discussion is a part of the
spice of life;" 39 and
d) the phrase come any time to a Latin American really
means what it says; to an American, it is "just an
expression of friendliness. You are not really expected to
show up unless your host proposes a specific time. "40
These are only but a few of the many examples which highlight the
impact of different national customs on the outcome of negotiations. With
this in view, one could expect discrepancies between a negotiations matrix
drawn up by a non-American D or B and one outlined by an American D
or B with regards to the shared, independent, or conflicting needs of the
respective parties on the famous scale of "essential, important and
desirable.", Nonetheless, the cultural gap still faces both D and B, from a
common culture, in their negotiations with their D and B counterparts from
a different cultural environment.
V. THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE
In spite of the presumed growth of what may be termed a universal
language of negotiation, the direct role of language in influencing the
outcome of negotiations should be recognized as a challenge to the
international negotiator, regardless of whether he/she is a D or a B.
Quoting Lorand Szalay, Raymond Cohen reiterates that:
the idea itself does not really travel, only the code, the
words, [and] the patterns of sound or print [travel]. The
meaning that a person attaches to the words received will
come from his mind. His interpretation is determined by

37. Id.
38. Id.
39.
40.
41.
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Id.
Id.
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his own frame of reference, his ideas, interests, past
experiences, etc ..... ,,,2
On that basis, the international negotiator, who is the product of a
culture different from that of his counterpart, is faced not only with a
cultural gap but with a linguistic gap which reflects an "inter-cultural
dissonance." 3 In that context, the role of language in negotiation is not
only the transmission of information from one negotiator to another, but it
is also "a social instrument - a device for preserving and promoting social
interests. ""
The inter-cultural dissonance represented by inter-cultural and
cross-linguistic communication is further magnified by the needs of D and
B negotiators to rely on interpretation.
Experience in multi-lingual
organizations, such as the United Nations, where negotiations involve a
large number of parties hearing one another in one of six official languages
(Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish) demonstrate the
magnitude of this problem. The same dissonance may apply even when
the negotiator is using, not his/her, but a second language which is the
mother tongue of his/her counterpart.
The import of this is that
"negotiators not only have to question whether their meaning will be
transmitted through interpretation and translation, but also whether it will
be communicated when the respondent is speaking the negotiator's own
4
language as a second language."
Both D and B face the linguistic challenge from another
perspective: "[w]hat will happen in interpretation if an idea or concept
does not exist in the other culture?" 46 When Japan was exposed to the
West, there was no word for democracy. The Anglo-Saxon notion of fair
play has no precise equivalent in either French or Spanish. Obviously in
these circumstances, the interpreters "supply their own assumed
meaning[s], '"47 despite the possible damage which may be inflicted on
communications. In fact, it is reported that Edmund Glenn, former chief
of the Language Services Division at the United States Department of

42. COHEN, supra note 8, at 19-20.
43. Id. at 19.
44. Id.
45.

GLEN FISHER, INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION:

62 (1980).
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47. Id. at 63.
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State, insists that "interpreters often do have difficulty in transmitting the
logical thrust of key statements."41
In certain situations, reliance by the negotiators on interpreters
may blunt the edge of confrontations. But by the same token, it could
produce a very different and negotiable result.
The interpretation
dilemma; which some negotiators try to mitigate by speaking slowly,
providing a text to the interpreter, writing out the figures for the other
party to see, and/or by briefing the interpreter in advance of the subject of
negotiation; is compounded when the speaker uses idioms that have no
equivalents in the other language. This may have given rise to the
statement by James Evans that "[t]o work through an interpreter is like
hacking one's way through a forest with a feather. 4 9 On the humorous
side of this linguistic dilemma, it is reported that the phrase "'out of sight,
out of mind' was once translated into Russian and back to English as
'invisible maniac.""' Even Presidents are not immune to interpretation
mishaps. When President Carter visited Poland in 1977, the President's
phrase "desires for the future" was translated as his "lusts for the future."'
VI. INTERESTS, NOT POSITIONS, As Focus
As negotiators, successful diplomats, like successful businessmen
and businesswomen, are constantly challenged by the notion that "behind
opposed positions lie shared and compatible interests. "12
The intergovernmental, as well as the transnational business negotiators, need to
find shared interests with their counterparts. In order for them to succeed
they have to explain, not coerce or argue. Both D and B have to be
attentive to the adage pronounced by Oliver Wendell Holmes: "Deepseated preferences cannot be argued about - you cannot argue a man into
liking a glass of beer. "' 3 D and B's goal identical: "to create a solution
that is acceptable from two different perspectives by reconciling
interests. "s' This is the reason why successful negotiators, in their attempt
to increase the flow of information from the other side and to "keep the
relationship mutually beneficial,"" use questions "beginning with 'what'
48. Id. at 64.
49.

GRIFFIN & DAGGATr, supra note 1, at 39.

50. Id. at 43.
51. Id. at 44.
52. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:
WITHOUT GIVING IN 43 (1991).

53.

GRIFFIN & DAGGATT, supra note 1, at 99.

54.

Id.

55. Id.at 163.
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rather than 'why.'"s1 Such well-formulated and conciliatory questions, not
only increase the informational flow, they help uncover shared interests.
In an article in Forbes, the game theory, as applied to successful
business negotiations, was revisited." Under the heading How To Succeed
In Business by Being Nice To Your Competitors, the author cites several
examples of big United States businesses that discovered that self-interest
does not lie in killing the competition.,, The strategy used by Philip
Morris in its price war against RJR Nabisco was to "inflict pain on RJR,
not to destroy RJR, but to persuade it to stop cutting prices on discount
cigarettes." 59 This approach is analyzed in the article under the heading, of
Evolutionary Economics.' The article expounds on the evolution of this
"altruistic behavior," which "can be used to craft optional business
strategies, "61 using recent examples of Wal-Mart, Japanese car
manufacturers' use of voluntary export restraints, IBM, Merck & Co.,
United States West, and Time Warner. The article's main conclusion is
that "in cooperation lies survival."6 The article justifies this conclusion on
the basis of a novel merger of biology and economics. The author states:
"Both disciplines are concluding that nature is not entirely tooth and claw
and that the ability to cooperate may be one of mankind's tools for
evolutionary survival X and business survival, too."63
From the above, it becomes clear that the tenet of modem
negotiation, that interests, not positions, should be the central focus, has
much in common with Evolutionary Economics." Here it should be
recognized that B has a better advantage over D who may be under strict
instructions from his diplomatic superiors that sovereignty, for example,
cannot be subject to negotiation. One may safely presume that the Syrian
negotiators in their current dialogue with the Israelis in Washington, D.C.,
and elsewhere, regarding the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, could not
bargain away Syria's claimed sovereignty over that territory.
B
negotiator, in most instances, would not face this dilemma of nonnegotiable issues as would D in certain circumstances.
56. Id. at 120.
57. Rita Koselka, Evolutionary Economics: Nice Guys Don't Finish Last, FORBES, Oct.
11, 1993, at 110-14.
58

Id.

59. Id. at 112.
60. Id. at 111.

61. Id.
62. Id.at 114.
63. Koselka, supra note 57, at 112.
64.

Id. at 110.
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However, both D and B share in their common concern for
establishing and maintaining good personal relations with the other
interlocutors.
Fostering good personal relations in the course of
negotiations may be accomplished through a variety of means: arguing for
interests not positions; debating some aspects of positions, not
personalities; "setting the opening negotiating position to support a
mutually acceptable agreement and concessions at an appropriate rate[;]J "
"putting aside difficult items for later trading[;]" 6 and, promoting
agreement through the creation of "timely deadlines for completing
negotiations." 67
Regardless of the tactics used by either D or B, the over-arching
strategy for successful international negotiations is to focus on shared
interests with the other party.
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The thesis of this article is that in spite of obvious differences
between the position of an inter-governmental political or diplomatic
negotiator and that of a transnational business negotiator, there is a great
deal of commonality among the challenges facing both of them. The
interchangeability of personnel between the worlds of international
business and international diplomacy, and the accelerating identification of
international business with the political affairs of states, heighten the need
for recognition of these common challenges. Since the basic skills of the
negotiator, whether a D or a B, are primarily the same, such skills and
strategies will have to be employed in the context of national
characteristics dictating negotiation styles.
This article's selection of a few, though important, common
challenges is meant to support the theme of the existence of a commonality
of challenges. It goes without saying that a resourceful D or a resourceful
B would quickly recognize that the options available within the diplomatic
context may vary from those present in the context of international
business. As an example, the options available to Americans negotiating
on behalf of GM for a joint venture with Toyota Japanese negotiators may
perceive a broader spectrum of options available to them, as compared to
the options available to Russian diplomats negotiating with the Japanese
foreign ministry for an aid package for Moscow. Nonetheless "bargaining

65. KRIESBERG, supra note 5, at 124.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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success is contingent on resourcefulness"" in either of these two scenarios.
From the pre-negotiation stage to the eventual successful conclusion of
negotiations, transcending the cultural gap and the linguistic interpretation
gaps, the most critical question which either D or B should keep in mind
is: "What can help craft cooperative solutions that create a continuing
incentive to maintain and enhance the relationship."6 9

68.
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69. GRIFFIN & DAGGATT, supra note 1, at 21.
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